This paper develops a general equilibrium model of the gender wage gap. The difference in earnings is a consequence of a demographic regularity -that men tend to marry younger women -which may limit women's labor mobility and hence their average earnings. However, couples are always free not to marry, and do so only if it is in each's self-interest. The intrafamily allocation of resources is determined via noncooperative bargaining; this leads to interesting interactions between the game played by husband and wife on the one hand, and the competitive environment in which they are immersed on the other. The model's predictions are consistent with several stylized facts regarding the gender gap. For example, the observation that the increasing stress put by women on their careers over the past thirty years has been contemporaneous with reductions in both marriage rates and the gender gap fits well with this model's interplay between locational choice and family bargaining. The model provides insight into the consequences of this for the relative welfare of men and women, as well as exploring its wider economic implications.
of two-career families in large cities (where matching two jobs is easier), but it suggests more generally an increase in the cost for women of being tied to the city chosen by their husband. In the context of our model this should lead to the reductions in the marriage rates (and in the gender gap) which have in fact been observed. Further discussion of the empirical underpinnings of our model is provided below.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic outline of the model. Section 3 reviews some empirical evidence which supports our model. Section 4 briefly surveys the related literature on the modeling of the gender gap and discusses the contribution of our paper. In Section 5 we develop the model in full generality. Sections 6 then discusses the notion of equilibrium used in this paper, which is illustrated by numerical examples in section 7. The main results of the paper are presented in graphical form in Section 8. The proof of existence of equilibrium is given in the appendix.
Outline of the Model
We begin with a simple rational-expectations general equilibrium model with overlapping generations as in Diamond (1965) . We now assume that there are two cities, denoted city I and city II. As we will see, these cities will represent specialization in the labor markets.
In each period, a continuum of men and women are born in each city. Each agent lives for two periods and is endowed with one unit of labor when young. The labor endowment of the individuals can be of one of two types. One unit of labor of type I is equivalent to one efficiency unit in city I, while it represents only β efficiency units when applied to city II. Analogously, one unit of type II labor is equivalent to only β efficiency units in city I, while it represents one unit if used in city II. These differences in productivity are reflected in the wage received by each type of labor in each city; this wage is set competitively, so as to equate the supply and demand for labor. It is important to note, however, that workers always have the opportunity to react to inter-city wage differentials by moving from one city to the other.
In this model, β represents the degree of city-specificity of labor. For example, each city may use a different language, and a worker will be able to obtain the best job only by being fluent in that language, otherwise he or she will be less productive in that city.
Another way to view β might be as representing some unmodeled investment in human 3 capital which is specific to one type of firm or industry which is concentrated in that city.
To this economic framework, we add the aforementioned constraint -that men marry younger women. Note that this is not an intrinsic difference but rather a sociological one.
It is modeled in the following manner. A man born in a particular period knows that in the following period he will be randomly matched to a woman born in that period. Thus he has only a 50% chance of being matched to a woman of the same type, and he makes his consumption and saving decisions with this in mind. Modeling individuals as not choosing their partners may be seen as representing the fact that it is difficult (if not impossible!) to choose with whom to fall in love.
3 Although this matching is itself free of economic considerations, we will see that the decision to marry is not.
Note that although we have assumed for simplicity that a couple has only one chance to marry, and that the probability of being matched to someone of the same type is equal to that of being matched to a different type, relaxing these assumptions would not qualitatively affect our results. For example, a search model could be approximated by making the probability of meeting someone of the same type higher than 1/2.
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The life-cycle now proceeds as follows. Since they are born unwed and do not have any information about their potential match, the men maximize their income by moving to the appropriate city. They then work in their youth, consume some of their earnings while young, and save the rest for their old age, all without knowing the type of the woman to whom they will be matched. In the next period, the men all propose marriage to their match. The sole benefit accruing to marriage is that the consumption which takes place during their single period of life together is a (household) public good for the couple.
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Consequently, a higher level of joint utility can be achieved for a given expenditure. At worst, men are indifferent to marriage, and may benefit from it if they are fortunate enough to marry a woman who does not want to save all of her income. Thus, as we will see, a man may well want to save more than he otherwise would in order to encourage a woman to marry him. Now consider the model from the perspective of a representative woman. As soon as the woman is born, she is randomly matched to a man from the previous generation. She must then decide whether to marry her match, and also how much to save and how much to contribute towards today's consumption -that is, the household public good. If she is matched to a man of her own type, then the benefits of marriage are clear and she will certainly accept the man's proposal. If, however, she is matched to someone living in a city of a type different from her own, then she faces a dilemma: she must either marry and receive a salary corresponding to her lower productivity, or she may choose to reject the offer and instead go to work in the city of her type for a higher wage; unfortunately, in this case she will relinquish the benefits of marriage and all of her consumption will be purely private. Her choice will depend on the terms of her husband's offer (that is, his savings) as well as factors in the underlying economy such as wages and interest rates. If what he has saved is large enough relative to the opportunities she gives up by marrying him, then she will marry, otherwise she will not. It is then not hard to see that a gender gap will occur when some women choose to marry even though by doing so they lower their (private) wage. Notice that our model has the implication as β, the specificity of labor, increases, then the marriage rate goes down (as women who are matched to men of the opposite type spurn their offers of marriage) and the gender gap shrinks.
Note that all agents, be they men or women, choose their city of lifetime residence in their first period of life. The only difference is that the men do so without knowing to whom they will be matched, whereas the women already have this information when they are young. In this model, individuals cannot relocate in their second period of life, even though they work only in the first period; this assumption is made for the sake of simplicity. One can conceive, however, of a more elaborate model in which agents can move at any time, work in both periods of life, and become more productive by remaining at a single job. Such a model would yield similar results, but at the cost of far greater complexity.
In this model, individuals are utility maximizers, and choose to marry only when it is in their self-interest. 6 We need, however, to specify the mechanism by which a married couple 6 See Becker (1991).
decides on the level of their joint consumption. Although there are potential benefits from marriage, the spouses do not have common interests. The husband, on the one hand, wants to consume as much as possible in this last period of his life, while the wife would like to save some income for her lonely future. As a result, they must bargain over the level of their joint consumption.
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There are several ways to model this. We take the extreme position of endowing the women with all the bargaining power. This means that the intrafamily division between joint consumption and saving (for the woman's lonely future) can be seen as the outcome of an ultimatum game. More precisely, although it is the man who brings his savings and proposes marriage to the woman, and therefore has a first-mover advantage, we assume that it is the woman who sets the ultimatum, in the form of the contribution the man anticipates she will make to their joint consumption.
This assumption is not critical to our results, and modifying it would yield a model with qualitatively similar predictions. Indeed, if one considers the polar opposite to this specification, in which it is the man who is endowed with all the bargaining power, then calculations with the Cobb-Douglas production function used in this paper demonstrate that marriage, and hence a gender gap, would be more likely to arise. This is because the man is able to save more without having to worry that the woman will appropriate his savings when they are of the same type, as occurs in this paper. In addition, such a model would be computationally simpler.
Demographic Underpinnings and Stylized Facts
One key assumption underlying this paper is the existence of an age gap between husband and wife. This assumption is supported by strong empirical evidence and can be observed in all countries; 8 for example, in 1988 the difference in median ages at first marriage was 1.8 years in the United States and 2.5 years in Europe. In fact, for the mechanism of our model to apply, the actual length of the age gap need not be very large -all that is 7 The notion that bargaining takes place within the family is also well-established in the popular literature. For instance, Mahony (1995) In our model, agents choose their city of residence when young. As a result, the aforementioned age gap implies that a woman's decision as to where to live is tied directly to the decision as to whether to marry or not. Suppose that agents were randomly born in cities. 10 In this case the model would predict that the migration of men is more likely to increase their wage than that of women. This results from the fact that male migrants would be more likely to move in order to increase their wage, rather than to follow their mate. This is supported by Mincer (1978) , who finds that married women are the least likely to increase their wages as a result of family migration. More recent evidence along these lines can be found in Payne and Warner (1992) . Another interesting paper is that of Costa and Kahn (1999) , who find that college educated couples are increasingly concentrated in large metropolitan areas; they attribute at least half of this increase to the growing severity of the colocation problem as women place more stress on career and less on family.
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Although we assume it, there are of course several possible explanations for the existence of an age gap. The reader can conceive of biological or evolutionary reasons for why a man might "want" a younger woman, or vice-versa. There are also some interesting economic explanations for this phenomenon; see, for example, Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) .
Finally, an interesting study which bears mention is that of Chandler, Kamo and Werbel (1994) , who find that delaying marriage has a positive impact on female wages and no significant effect on male wages. This can be interpreted as support for our model -if women delay marriage, then they are less likely to be students at the time of marriage and hence will be more likely to choose from a pool of men from the same "city".
9 This is confirmed by the PSID -a table is available from the authors upon request. 10 Alternatively, if one treats the agents as being born in the city of their own type (i.e. in which their wage is maximized), then the model would predict that the only migrants are women who move to marry. This is indeed the case for rural India; as Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) point out, "approximately 80 percent of . . . 'lifetime migrants' were women who gave marriage as the principal reason for their move. Migration in India is thus predominantly a marital phenomenon . . . ."
11 See also Frank (1978) .
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This paper is by no means the first to study the question of the gender gap.
The closest work to ours is Siow (1998) . Siow develops a model in which women differ from men in that they have a shorter period of fecundity. As in our model, the interaction between the competitive environment and the marriage market plays a pivotal role. Our paper is distinct, however, in that our general equilibrium approach also takes account of the impact that the labor-market decisions arising from the marriage market have on the competitive environment (and not only the impact on financial markets, as in Siow). In addition, we also highlight the importance of locational choice and labor-market specialization, a factor which we argued above is of increasing importance. Finally, in our model the difference between men and women is not necessarily an advantage accruing to the men, which is unique. More precisely, although the men have a first-mover advantage,
we endow the women with the ultimatum power. There is no a priori reason for one to always dominate the other, and in fact, depending on the parameter values, either the man or the woman can be better-off in equilibrium.
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In Francois (1998) there are two symmetric equilibria -in one only men get efficiency wage jobs (which pay a higher wage) while women do not, while in the other the roles are reversed. This discrimination is a coordinated response to the fact that if both members of a couple hold efficiency wage jobs then they will be likelier to shirk.
Another related paper is that of Engineer and Welling (1999) , who explore the equilibria in a model in which men are randomly matched to women ("true love"). In their model there are two types of complementary human capital and a coordination problem arises because training takes place before true love strikes. They find examples when, even 12 Indeed, in the rest of literature there is an exogenous difference between men and women which unambiguously favors men. For example, in Galor and Weil (1996) men are endowed with two types of labor, physical and mental, while women have only mental labor. In others, although the gender gap is the result of discrimination, meaning that it does not reflect lower marginal productivity on the part of women, it is nevertheless facilitated by some exogenous difference. For example, in RothschildStiglitz (1982) women have noisier signals and thus receive a lower wage. Similarly, in segmented labor market models such as Goldin (1986) , women have shorter working lives, and it is thus more difficult to monitor them -therefore they are less likely to be candidates for efficiency-wage jobs. See also Lazear and Rosen (1990) , in which women are promoted less readily than men (and thus earn less on average), because they have an advantage in extra-market production and hence are likelier to leave the workforce. 8 without discrimination, there arises a perfect correlation between sex and family roles.
Another paper which explores the implications of complementarities in human capital for gender roles is Hadfield (1999) .
The other strand of the literature to which our paper relates is that of bargaining within the family. The roots of this approach are in Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) , who applied the Nash bargaining solution to analyze marriage and divorce; this literature is surveyed by Bergstrom (1997) . One recent paper in this tradition is Echevarria and Merlo (1999) , which uses a combination of OLG and Nash bargaining between husband and wife to present a dynamic explanation of gender differences in the education of children. In our paper we have chosen, however, not to use a Nash bargaining model, nor Rubinstein-style bargaining, 13 but have rather modeled the decision-making process as an ultimatum game. We chose this form for its simplicity, but as we have already pointed out, the particular specification of the bargaining game does not qualitatively affect the results.
It is important to point out that, most of the aforementioned models take a partial equilibrium approach to the question of the gender gap. As we will see, in our model the very existence of a gender gap, and its consequences for welfare, depend critically on the relationship between wages and interest rates; thus taking these to be fixed seems to us to be flawed.
Finally, there are several papers which may be interpreted as explaining how, in contract to our model, a gender gap can cause an age gap. The paper by Keeley (1977 
) extends
Becker's work ((1973) and (1974)) on the costs and benefits of marriage to suggest that if men earn more than women, then men's marriage ages should decline with their wage rates, while women's should increase. Another theory, due to Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) ,
suggests that "good" men may marry later in order have more time to signal their type;
in their model women cannot signal -the implication is that they can only work at more menial jobs for which there is no uncertainty as to productivity. These theories are tested by Danziger and Neumann (1999) .
13 See Bergstrom (1997).
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5 The Model
The Technology -A Tale of Two Cities
We begin with the description of the technology.
There are two firms (firm I and firm II), located in two different cities (city I and city II). Each has the same production function F (K, L), where L represents efficiency units of labor and F is homogeneous of degree 1. The only difference between the firms is in the manner by which they transform physical labor into efficiency units. 
Let k i (i = I, II) denote the (per-efficiency unit) capital stock demanded by firm i.
Notice that full mobility of labor and capital ensures that the price of an efficiency unit of labor and of capital will be constant across cities. Therefore, profit maximization and price-taking behavior on the part of firms implies that, for each firm i (located in city i),
we have:
where w is the wage rate paid per efficiency unit of labor and r is the rental rate of capital, assuming full depreciation of capital.
These equations imply, in fact, that each firm has the same demand for capital (per efficiency units of labor), which we denote by k.
Individuals and their Marriage Games
In every period t, a set of individuals with mass 1 is born. Each individual lives for two periods and has identical preferences, given by the utility function
where c t is the consumption of the individual when young, and c t+1 when old.
Individuals within a generation are classified into four categories, each of which encompasses a population of measure 1/4.
Half of the generation t is born with one unit of labor of type I while the other half is born with one unit of labor of type II. We will term these agents "type I" and "type II", respectively. Labor can be used only when young and we assume that there is no utility accruing to leisure, so agents will want to sell all of their labor endowment.
In addition, half of each of these types are men and the other half are women. Thus the distribution of types within a generation may be summarized by the following As we have already discussed, the only difference between male and female is institutional and consists of the constraint that men are allowed to marry only younger women (one at most). Marriage within a generation is not permitted and old women are also not allowed to marry young males. We take this pattern of behavior as exogenously given.
The Marriage Game
The best way to clarify the interaction between the agents is to focus attention on the three periods of a representative couple's life. For this purpose consider the following game of perfect information and chance moves, 14 which is depicted in Figure 1 . There are three periods in each couple's life. In period 1, the man is born and works, earning a wage w 1 . He must then decide how much of this income to save for period 2.
We denote this saving by s M .
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In the following period (period 2), the man is randomly matched to a woman born in this period to whom he proposes marriage. With probability 1 2
, the woman is of his own (labor) type, and with probability properly belongs to the specification of the solution concept, which we now discuss.
The Solution Concept
We look for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) of this marriage game. That is, the solution must induce a Nash equilibrium on each subgame. As usual, we determine this solution by working backwards. That is, we first determine the utility levels both when the 15 Note that we have defined the rental rate of capital so that $1 saved by an individual will return r in the following period.
16 Alternatively, we could have dropped this restriction and allowed the man in turn to either accept or reject the woman's proposed division.
couple marry and when they do not. Based on this, we next analyze the woman's decision -whether or not to marry -given the man's savings. Finally, we determine the man's optimal savings and thus the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game.
We have already seen that when the couple do not marry, then the man consumes s M r 2 in the second period of his life, giving him a utility level of ln(s M r 2 ). The woman, on the other hand, splits her wage w 2 between consumption and saving for the future, giving her utility ln(
In case the couple does marry, however, then the rules of the game specify that the woman choose the division (c i , s i ) of the joint income, subject to the aforementioned constraints. Given the man's savings s M , her optimal decision is the solution (c i , s i ), for i = S, D, to the following problem:
It can be seen that the solution to this problem is:
Note that this solution takes one of two forms, depending on the relationship between the man's savings s M and his wife's income I i . If the man's savings are sufficiently large (in fact, if the future value of his savings s M r 2 exceeds the woman's income I i ) then the woman will not contribute anything to their joint consumption and will free-ride. Otherwise, she will contribute a positive amount, and both will strictly benefit from marriage.
Having specified the outcomes both in the case where the couple marries and when 14 they live separately, we can now analyze the marriage decision itself. The woman will certainly accept the marriage proposal when the utility accruing to marriage exceeds that of remaining single. We make the further assumption that when the woman is indifferent, she chooses to marry.
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If the man and the woman are of the same type, then it is immediate that she accepts the proposal, since s M ≥ 0 and she does not give up anything by marrying. When they are not of the same type, however, the woman faces a dilemma. Should she opt for the higher wage which she would receive if she did not marry and lived instead in the other city, or should she take advantage of the benefits accruing to marriage, namely the opportunity to share in the man's savings? In fact, she will choose to marry if the man's contribution is large enough to compensate the drop in salary which she incurs by marrying, that is, if
Hence, given the man's saving s M , his second period consumption when matched to a woman of the same type is given by:
The woman's corresponding savings is:
Similarly, if the man is matched to a woman of the opposite type, then his second period consumption and the woman's savings are given, respectively, by:
Note that when the woman contributes nothing, the man's second period consumption is precisely equal to his savings (plus accumulated interest). This can occur either if he saves so little that the woman rejects the proposal (when she is of a different type), or if he saves so much that, although they marry, the woman free-rides.
Having determined the solution to the (woman's) subgames, it remains to calculate the man's optimal saving. Note that he chooses his savings without knowing which type of woman he will be matched to; of course, he knows what to expect from each type.
That is, the man must choose his savings s M so as to maximize his expected utility
where , then the couple always marries and the woman will always free ride, contributing nothing to their joint consumption.
Case 2 If his savings satisfies
, then they will still always marry, and when the man and woman are of the same type she will contribute (whereas if they are not of the same type then she will not contribute).
Case 3 If his savings satisfies
, the couple will always marry and the woman will always contribute to the joint consumption.
Case 4 Finally, if his savings is less than
(1−β)w 2 r 2 , then they only marry if they are of the same type. In this case, the woman will contribute to joint consumption.
In fact, the man's problem can be interpreted as follows. For each case, the man has a separate optimization problem, determined by an inequality which his savings must satisfy.
What makes this decomposition interesting is that these cases correspond to different modes of behavior on the part of the women, and thus to four relatively simple optimization problems. He solves each of these sub-problems, and then chooses the case which gives him the highest utility. This gives him his optimal saving.
Definition of Equilibrium
We look for a steady state equilibrium of the economy, in which markets clear, firms maximize profits and couples play subgame perfect Nash equilibria of their respective marriage games. Note that this solution concept differs from the classical competitive equilibrium only in that rather than simply individually maximizing their utilities, agents instead play a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of their two-person marriage game. While the agents do indeed take prices as given, the consumption-savings decision in the context of the family is modeled as a two-person problem; that is, as a game.
As the examples in the following section make clear, in order to ensure the existence of equilibrium we must admit heterogeneity in the agents' behavior. In order to obtain this heterogeneity, we take advantage of the fact that for certain wage and interest rates, there are two subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the marriage game, between which the men are indifferent. As a result, we can have a certain fraction of the population play according to one of these equilibria, and the rest play according to the other. Allowing for this also smoothes the abrupt transitions in behavior between the cases.
Definition:
A steady state equilibrium is a pair (w, r) of (efficiency) wage rate and capital rental rate, a pair of cases i = j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, and corresponding nonnegative population weights 18 λ i + λ j = 1 such that:
where
and (iii) For = i, j with λ = 0:
• s M ∈ s M (w, w, r) is defined to be the man's subgame perfect equilibrium savings when he plays according to case , and this is optimal for him.
•
The interpretation of this definition is as follows. Condition (iii), first of all, requires that the agents' decisions be consistent with a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the marriage game. That is, given that a man saves s M , a woman who is matched to him and is of the same type will optimally save s S , while one who is of the opposite type will want to save s D . Given that women act in this way, s M must in fact be optimal for the man.
Condition (ii) gives the profit-maximizing conditions for firms, and hence the demand for capital.
18 With zero weight on one of the cases if this equilibrium corresponds purely to a single case.
As for condition (i), this requires that the level of investment by firms be equal to the aggregate saving in the economy, per efficiency unit of labor, and hence that capital market clear. In order to ensure market-clearing, it may be necessary for a fraction λ i of the population to play the subgame perfect equilibrium corresponding to case i, and λ j to play the other.
If the equilibrium consists of only cases 1-3, then as we have already seen, the couple always marries, regardless of whether they are of the same type or not. In this case, each man contributes one efficiency unit of labor, each woman who is of the same type as her husband contributes one unit as well, and each woman who is of the opposite type to her husband contributes β efficiency units of labor. Since men make up one half of the individuals alive in each period, and each type of woman makes up one-fourth, the total efficiency units of labor supplied amounts to:
Therefore, per efficiency unit, the total saving is:
1 2
) which simplifies to
For couples playing case 4, however, we know marriage takes place only when they are of the same type. So each agent playing this case supplies one efficiency unit and hence the total efficiency supply of labor is one. The capital market clearing conditions are then a straightforward extension of those discussed above.
Some Numerical Examples
To help clarify the results of the model, we now present several numerical examples.
Consider a Cobb-Douglas production function
For the sake of these examples, we fix α = 0.3.
Example 1 Let β = 0.75. In this case, the steady state equilibrium is given by w = 0.420712 and r = 0.9841327. This equilibrium falls in the province of case 3, in which all women accept their marriage proposals, and also contribute to the marital consumption.
It can be shown that, for the corresponding marriage game, the man's subgame perfect equilibrium saving is s M = 0.106875. This is in fact the minimum he must save in order to be able to convince a woman of opposite type to marry him (which is precisely his optimal strategy given the equilibrium wage and rental rate). As a result, we know from equation (1) that when he marries a woman of his type, she will split their total resources equally between savings s S = 0.262945 and joint consumption c S . Similarly, equation (2) tells us that when his wife is of a different type, she will save s D = 0.210356 and they will jointly consume the same (c D = 0.210356); as mentioned above, for these parameters the man saves just enough so that the woman is indifferent to marrying.
For this case, the total savings leads to a supply of capital (per efficiency unit of labor)
of k = 0.183213, as per equation (3). If we evaluate the profit maximizing conditions (4) at this capital stock, we obtain the wage and rental rates given above, and hence markets clear.
Notice that since couples always marry, a gender gap results. In particular, the average wage earned by women is only (1 + β)/2 = 0.875 that of the men.
Example 2 Now let β = 0.51. It can be verified that the steady state equilibrium is now given by w = 0.440672 and r = 0.883242. This equilibrium corresponds to case 4, where a woman marries only if it would not affect her income -that is, if she is of the same type as her match.
The man's subgame perfect equilibrium saving is s M = 0.169817. Thus, equation (1) implies that when he is matched to a woman of his own type, he marries and his wife The total savings now leads to a supply of capital (per efficiency unit of labor) of k = 0.213825, as per equation (3). As before, if we evaluate the profit maximizing conditions (4) at this capital stock, we obtain the wage and rental rates given above, and hence markets clear.
As we have already pointed out, in this case there is no gender gap.
Example 3 Now take β = 0.6. For these parameters, there is no equilibrium in which all of the agents play according to the same Nash equilibrium.
19 So we must allow for heterogeneity in the agents' behavior. For the parameters given above, the equilibrium wage will then be w = 0.485856 and the rental rate r = 0.703341.
The corresponding marriage game has two subgame perfect Nash equilibria. In the first equilibrium, corresponding to case 3, men save 0.276313, which is exactly enough to persuade a woman of a different type to marry him, while women save either 0.340099 or 0.242928, depending on whether they marry a husband of the same type or not. The second equilibrium corresponds to case 4. Men choose to consume more during their youth and save only 0.183097. As a consequence, women find it worthwhile to accept a man's proposal only when they are of the same type; in this case they save 0.340099. If they are of a different type, however, they prefer to build a career and earn a higher wage w, saving 0.242928.
When a fraction 0.793047 of the agents play according to the first equilibrium and the rest of the population plays according to the second one, then the total savings per efficiency units of labor equals 0.29605. If we evaluate the profit maximizing conditions at this capital stock, we obtain the wage and rental rates given above and hence markets clear. The resulting equilibrium gender gap is 16%.
Marriage and the Gender Gap
This section describes the relationship between the technological parameters and the nature of the equilibria. These results are summarized in the following pictures. as we lower α we move to an equilibrium which mixes cases 1 and 2. Continuing to lower α, the proportion of the population which plays as per case 1 eventually drops to zero and we are left in case 2. As α drops further, the equilibria fall into a mixture of case 2 and 3, then a pure case 3 equilibrium, mixed case 3 and 4, and finally, for small α, a pure case 4 equilibrium. . As β decreases this gender gap at first increases, since all women continue to marry and those who find themselves in the "wrong" city earn less than before. When β drops sufficiently, however, women stop marrying when they are matched to a man of the wrong type, and the gender gap becomes zero. It is not clear that this drop in the gender gap should necessarily have a positive effect on women's utility, however, because the men have been compensating them with their savings from the reduction in income which occurs with marriage to a man of opposite type; when women stop marrying men of opposite type and this subsidy ceases, the women who continue to marry are hurt. This issue will be explored more carefully below.
As a comparative statics exercise, consider further the effect of reducing α on the gender gap. From figure 2, one can see that this leads to a shift from case 1, to 2, to 3 and then eventually to case 4. The only change in the gender gap occurs as we shift from case 3 to 4
and women cease to marry men of the opposite type (the gender gap then drops to zero).
This occurs because as α falls the equilibrium interest rate decreases 21 and it becomes increasingly difficult for men to save enough to convince women of the opposite type to marry them.
equilibria in which case 2 plays a role with another case; instead, we find equilibria which mix cases 1 and 3. 21 As in the standard Diamond (1965) model.
We now turn our attention to the implications of the model for the relative utility of men and women. The difference in expected utility between men and women is plotted in figure 5 and a cross-section for α = 0.3 is given in figure 6 . Notice in this second figure that
for large values of β the men are better-off than the women, and that this is only reversed for values of β which are sufficiently small that they no longer wish to marry. This is somewhat surprising, because at first glance, as we argued earlier, the women who are no longer marrying are not necessarily better-off than they were before (when they married but earned less), since the men had been compensating them for their lower earnings.
Furthermore, we argued that this phasing out of the men's savings subsidy actually hurts the women who continue to marry. What is in fact occuring here is a general equilibrium effect. As β drops, women cease to marry if they are of opposite type to their match, and men reduce their savings. The result is an increase in the equilibrium interest rate, because of a reduction in total savings. This actually favors the women, because they tend to save more on average than the men -since they save not only part of their own income but also whatever has been contributed by the men (which itself accrues interest). Finally, it is once again interesting to consider the comparative statics exercise of reducing α while holding β fixed. As can be seen from figure 5, reducing α tends to favor the men. Once again, this is due in part to the effect this has on the equilibrium interest rate. In addition, however, there is a further effect which also favors the men. As can be seen from figure 2, for large values of α we are in the province of cases 1 and 2, in which women free-ride; this free-riding is an expression of their ultimatum power -i.e.
that they are able to extract all of the surplus from the joint marital consumption. As the α, and hence the equilibrium interest rate, drop, however, the joint consumption falls (since the accrued interest on the men's savings is lower) and their ultimatum power loses its "bite".
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have developed a general equilibrium model of the gender wage gap. The difference in earnings arises from our assumption that men tend to marry younger women -this implies that women have less flexibility in the labor force and as a result earn lower wages on average. Our explanation is consistent with much of the evidence on the gender gap -that it is greatest between married men and women, that it is reflected not in overt discrimination but rather in sorting across occupations. Colocational choice also plays an important role, and our model suggests that the factors which have been increasing the severity of this problem may be responsible for both declining marriage rates and a reduction in the gender gap. Finally, the model also highlights some of the general equilibrium effects which can arise from a reduction in the gender gap, and their effect on the relative welfare of men and women.
